High-resolution individual geolocation data passively collected from mobile phones is increasingly sold in private markets and shared with researchers. This data poses significant security, privacy, and ethical risks: it's been shown that users can be re-identified in such datasets, and its collection rarely involves their full consent or knowledge. This data is valuable to private firms (e.g. targeted marketing) but also presents clear value as a public good. Recent public interest research has demonstrated that high-resolution location data can more accurately measure segregation in cities and provide inexpensive transit modeling. But as data is aggregated to mitigate its re-identifiability risk, its value as a good diminishes. How do we rectify the clear security and safety risks of this data, its high market value, and its potential as a resource for public good? We extend the recently proposed concept of a tradeoff curve that illustrates the relationship between dataset utility and privacy. We then hypothesize how this tradeoff differs between private market use and its potential use for public good. We further provide real-world examples of how high resolution location data, aggregated to varying degrees of privacy protection, can be used in the public sphere and how it is currently used by private firms.
The Risk-Utility Tradeoff
There is a clear tradeoff between the utility of location data to both private firms and the public good, and the privacy risk it presents to individuals. How should this data be structured to preserve user privacy while still yielding useful information? There are a variety of strategies and technical solutions to address this problem, and a sizable body of literature quantifying their impact on utility and individual privacy risk. Most of these works address strategies where data providers aggregate data to larger spatial or temporal resolutions, which can make it harder to re-identify individuals while still providing value.
Consider a LBS dataset in its standard form, such as the dataset we obtained. The same user ID is associated with each timestamped location point for a given user (Table 1) , providing for a more precise analysis of user trajectories.
Coarsening this data spatially might mean replacing a user's precise GPS coordinates with the city block the user was on, or a statistical area such as a census block group. Providers can also coarsen data along the dimension of time, where time might be stored in 1-hour or 6-hour increments, rather than at the minute (or millisecond) level of accuracy available to LBS firms. Simple coarsening of spatial or temporal resolution can increase the number of points needed to re-identify someone in a large dataset [5, 26] , and therefore reduce risk. But this reduction is limited.
The same seminal 2013 study which showed that just four spatio-temporal points were enough to uniquely identify 95% of the 1.5 million users in a CDR dataset also analyzed the relationship between re-identifiability and data resolution.
The authors found that "the uniqueness of mobility traces decays approximately as the 1 10 power of their resolution" [5] . Other studies find that reliable anonymization is only realized when data is coarsened so much as to be of little value, such as aggregating spatial resolution to the level of cities [26] . These key insights show that while reducing data resolution does increase privacy, the privacy gain is slow, and "even coarse datasets provide little anonymity [5] . Still, these "legacy solutions", often variations of the seminal k-anonymity algorithm introduced in 1998, are the de-facto current standard for mitigating risk in location datasets [27, 28] . The problem of balancing personal risk with utility in behavioral datasets, and location datasets in particular, isn't new.
There are sizable computational literatures that detail both re-identification and anonymization strategies for CDRs and location data, and they often directly or indirectly imply a relationship between utility and risk [29, 30, 31, 32, 5, 26] .
To formalize the concepts of risk and utility, researchers persistently define both in ways that strip them of their social contexts. Risk and utility are often defined as measures of the data itself, or as the abstract predictive power of state-of-the-art models trained on it. In the case of risk, these measures usually amount to the average quantity of data from a secondary source someone would need to identify an individual in a dataset. These definitions avoid the social context in which data is collected or shared, and so may lead to a false sense of security about its release. As an example, take the relative risk of membership in a mobility dataset for a U.S. citizen and a non-citizen immigrant. Their contextual risk is radically different. The U.S. citizen may never be identified or targeted, while the immigrant has a very real risk of being targeted and deported by the state using location information. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) already uses license-plate reader data to target immigrants for deportation, and has discussed using mobile location datasets to do the same [33] . Conversely, in the context of utility, one must ask: "utility for whom?".
What utility does the immigrant community gain through the release of such data?
Another limitation of considering risk and utility computationally is that it risks mischaracterizing both as static attributes of a specific dataset, rather than a dynamic quantity. Both the risk and utility of a dataset should be considered relative to the state of adversarial technologies, the ease of acquiring external data about an individual in the set, as well as the contextual social and political use cases of the data itself. As technology has advanced, new techniques for re-identifying individuals in aggregated or 'privacy-preserving' data have been developed. In 2017, a group of researchers published a technique to re-create individual trajectories from aggregated location data that had been considered highly protective of individual privacy by the research community [34] . We expect such techniques to only develop and become more widespread in the future. At the same time, external data that can aid in re-identifying individuals has become increasingly accessible. For example, social media posts on public networks such as Instagram and Twitter are commonly geotagged with an individual's location. Even without geotagging, an individual's location can be inferred through images or local information in their post.
Given these limitations, we aim to provide workable, contextual examples of how the trade-off between 'risk' and 'utility' has appeared in the real world without formal or computational definitions, and speculate on how this trade-off might present itself in the future. Instead of formally quantifying risk, we describe varying aggregation strategies applied to the same hypothetical LBS dataset that might incrementally mitigate its level of risk. For each aggregation case, we describe brief specific examples of current or potential uses in two different contexts. First, we detail an example of how private firms currently use or might use the data at that aggregation level. Second, we describe how such data is currently used for 'public interest' projects and can serve the public good. In both cases, we provide brief analyses of the risk and utility these examples afford in an attempt to bridge the gap between computational measures of privacy and risk of the data itself and the social contexts of its possible use.
To help contextualize the relationship between our analysis and the computational literature on risk and privacy, we borrow the idea of a utility-privacy curve (figure 1), recently explored by Noriega-Campero et. al [35] . For different aggregation levels of CDR data, the authors compute the re-identifiability risk of the data, and quantify its 'utility' by surveying experts in CDR data use. Our aggregation cases differ from the ones presented by Noriega-Campero It plots utility vs. re-identification risk in mobile phone data, across spatial and temporal granularities {ZIP, District, Municipality} x {1h, 6h, 12h, 24h}. The more useful the dataset, the less auxiliary information is needed to re-identify its individuals. Conversely, while data generalization increasingly hinders re-identification, it strongly diminishes datasets' value [35] . Note that we switch the axes to plot utility on the vertical axis in our extension of this curve.
in two key ways. First, we consider high-granularity GPS data like that shared by LBS firms rather than CDR data.
The most granular data we discuss carries higher risk and different utility than the most granular data discussed by Noriega-Campero. Second, we consider alternative forms of aggregation that are considered less risky and less granular than those considered on the curve by Noreiga-Campero et al. Figure 2 illustrates how a speculative curve that includes our examples might extend the curve as presented by Noriega-Campero. We extend the curve by adding examples both in regions of lower and higher aggregation.
MAY 24, 2019
Figure 2: Our speculative extension of the utility-privacy curve presented by Noriega-Campero et. al. We plot utility on the y-axis and shade the portion of the curve discussed by Noriega-Campero. We extend the curve by considering additional levels of data aggregation, and the associated uses and risks for data at each aggregation level. Each horizontal segment, which we demarcate by enumerated 'levels', corresponds to a different aggregation strategy we discuss. Like Noriega et. al., our curve shows that the utility of data decreases as its level of aggregation increases.
Location Based Services Data

Level of Aggregation
Our first case considers the kind of location data shared by LBS companies in the data market today. This data can contain timestamped latitude and longitude points for each user in the dataset, accurate to within 10 meters and a few seconds. It is highly re-identifiable, and often allows firms to infer the precise positions of a user's home, work, and leisure locations. Table 1 shows an example set of location data from one user.
Market Utility
The market utility of data like this is hard to overstate. Individual, highly precise geolocation data is part of a new targeted geo-marketing industry, and the "holy grail" of advertising [36] . One use of this data is to link contextual behaviors to advertising targets. For example, businesses can target ads to individuals based on their previous visits to a store, a competitor's store, or their patterns of passing a storefront. Timberland did just this by working with LBS data provided by GrouthTruth in an attempt to sell more footwear [16] . Combined with geofencing strategies, user location MAY 24, 2019 data can be used for even more proactive marketing. With geofencing, target audiences can be identified based on their real-time location and delivered an ad at the opportune moment, such as the case of targeting ads for personal injury lawyers to people in emergency rooms [15] . Target audiences can also be identified based on their attendance to an event.
In an interview, a Chief Marketing Officer explained that their firm "...used geofencing for an entertainment client to target people at Comic Con because we knew our show's audience was there. That data drove activation, audience understanding and future targeting". By tracking people between events and places, including those seemingly unrelated to a product or service, marketing firms are able to move beyond market segmentation and deliver ads to individuals, based on their real-time behavior [36] .
Public Utility
At the same time, highly individual GPS trajectory data can have a large amount of public utility. In the United
States, when people in emergency situations call 911, their GPS coordinates are automatically provided to emergency dispatchers. This was made possible by the enhanced 911 initiative (E-911) in order to send callers help in a more timely manner. GPS data has also been utilized for public health. A study in Peru used GPS to track individuals who had been exposed to the Dengue virus in order to better understand its risk of transmission. Individualized location tracking of this kind has shown its utility in helping researchers and government agencies monitor the spread of infectious disease in efforts to protect the public from widespread epidemics [37] .
Risk
Given that the coarse CDR data can be used to re-identify users with just 4 points and reconstruct their trajectories, data that records latitude and longitude coordinates is even riskier. From this data, precise locations visited and home addresses can be inferred for re-identified users. This risk is not isolated to usage by "bad actors" who access the data through illegal means. In many cases, the re-identifiability of the data is it's selling point: the "bad actors" that cause personal risk are the legal users of the data. Police in the U.S. have used GPS data from mobile phones to identify and arrest suspects without a warrant, a practice that is now illegal [38] . Bounty hunters and skip-tracing firms seemingly use this data to locate people with no apparent oversight for low fees [39] . The risk that these uses bring to certain populations can be devastating. Stalkers and domestic abusers are known to use malware apps to track their targets and spouses, and bounty hunters have admitted to using their data subscriptions to track their own partners [39, 40] . The clearest use cases for this data outside of city and emergency planning and marketing are products that allow citizens and the state to target and trace individuals more effectively than ever before, indicating a high risk of abuse. 
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Level of Aggregation
This case of coarsened LBS data still refers to individual trajectory data, but with a lower spatial resolution than its original, high-resolution form. Records are still identified by a unique user ID, but instead of a spatial resolution at the order of meters, locations are identified by their Census Block Group. Table 2 shows an example of this data with a temporal resolution of one minute.
This level of granularity can be considered similar to that of CDRs, whose use cases have been well studied and documented. Mere observation of this data reveals the movements of individuals between neighborhoods. With simple tooling, mobility data at this resolution is detailed enough to describe traffic flows, geographic areas that an individual frequents, and a person's daily routines [41] . CDRs with this type of location data have been used in machine learning models to correctly infer the professions and unemployment status of individuals, as well as other socio economic characteristics [42] .
Market Utility
While businesses can no longer identify specific store visits using this coarser data, they can still perform targeted marketing. For example, "outdoor enthusiasts" can be identified by tracking users who spend more time in state parks or rural areas. L.L. Bean used location data in 2019 to target "outdoor enthusiasts" for online ads about their summer product line [43] .
Identifying and targeting "outdoor enthusiasts" is an example of using market segmentation to drive profits. Market segments are also commonly divided based on characteristics such as gender, age, or profession. These characteristics can be inferred from the coarse mobility data provided in CDRs, showing how this data can further contribute to the consumer revenue streams of private firms.
Data from CDRs has also been used to predict an individual's likelihood to make loan payments, providing banks and creditors with more information on whether to extend a loan. This can be particularly useful to financial institutions in developing countries where many households lack formal financial histories [44] .
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Public Utility LBS data aggregated at this level represents individual trajectory data similar to what is already collected by government surveys. The United States' National Household Travel Survey samples the population for data on their routine trips; the data serves a variety of public analyses and projects. For example, travel behavior is used for traffic prediction to help city transportation engineers better plan roadways and mitigate congestion [45] . Aggregated LBS data can supplement travel surveys with data collected at a scale much greater than survey samples. And this data can be collected in real-time instead of the limited snapshots provided by surveys, providing a more dynamic source of information for city governments.
This aggregregated LBS data can be used to supplement other surveys as well. The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 60,000 U.S. households conducted on behalf of the Bureau of Labor Statistics in order to estimate the unemployment rate and other market indicators [46] . Since researchers have shown that CDRs can be used to infer people's employment status [42] , this data could be used to supplement such surveys and monitor changes in employment status, or provide for countries where labor survey data is not easily collected.
Individual LBS data at this level of spatial aggregation can also be used to serve individuals timely alerts on behalf of the public. In the United States, the Federation of Internet Alerts subscribes to a LBS company in order to serve AMBER Alerts and severe weather warnings to people based on their location. According to the U.S. Office of Justice Programs, 957 children have been rescued due to the AMBER alert system [47] .
Risk
The re-identifiability risk in this data is high. Researchers have shown that only four spatio-temporal points are needed to re-identify 95% of users in such a dataset. This data no longer reports people's precise locations, making it more difficult to infer home addresses or the sensitive places they may have visited. However, understanding the daily mobility traces of individuals still provides valuable information to skip-tracing firms and law enforcement agencies.
This data has been particularly useful to law enforcement agencies, who do not need to do the extra work to re-identify individuals because they can ask for a person's data directly from providers.
Using CDRs to track suspects' movements and using their locations to implicate them at the time of trial has become Trajectory data also presents risk when used for predatory targeted marketing. The ability to infer socioeconomic characteristics for market segmentation or employment status to estimate market indicators from an individual's CDRs may be of utility when used in good faith. However, this information can also be exploited to target ads to vulnerable individuals.
For example, for-profit colleges, known for misleading students [50] , have targeted and recruited single mothers [51] .
Payday loan agencies, known for their business model of sending customers into spirals of debt [52] , often target low-income or recently unemployed people [53] .
Aggregated Location Data
Level of Aggregation
This level of aggregation no longer represents individual trajectory data. Each user is now identified by an identifier corresponding to their home census block group or other statistical area, rather than by a unique ID (Table 3) . The recorded locations might be highly precise, but they are not directly tied to the users that generated them.
This data can represent a precise distribution of people over space and time. It can be used to observe the places where groups of people congregate, spend time, or how groups of people move through space.
Market Utility
A common use case of location data for physical retailers is to help plan new business locations or expand their customer base [54] . Retailers can use aggregate location data to observe how much time people spend near a potential new storefront and compare foot traffic at nearby businesses and amenities. Businesses can also use this type of location data to estimate how far consumers are willing to travel for certain amenities or stores. The identifying census block group that corresponds to each point can be used as a proxy for where someone lives, and how far someone traveled to a given point such as a store's location can be estimated.
A potential consumer's distance to a store has been an important variable in retail location theory, such as modeling the best placement for a new supermarket outlet [55] .
This data can also be used in more targeted marketing strategies. For example, Athleta used location data to identify local areas of consumers who were more likely to become Athleta customers. Athleta successfully expanded their customer base by using "neighborhood targeting" to drive visits from new customers in targeted neighborhoods [56] .
Public Utility
Cities can use aggregate location data to better understand the behaviors and activities of their citizens [11] and plan urban interventions based on their real-time location dynamics.
Demographers can also use this data to measure how different spaces are used by different socioeconomic groups.
For example, segregation is often measured based on where people live, but researchers at MIT have used aggregate location data to also represent segregation based on where people spend their time. The Atlas of Inequality project (https://inequality.media.mit.edu) [57] shows the distribution of different socioeconomic groups at amenities throughout the city of Boston. This project leverages aggregate location data by inferring the socioeconomic groups from the census block group connected to the precise points of the amenities people visit. Analysis from this project is of use in city zoning and planning, as cities make efforts to develop more diverse environments.
Risk
Data aggregated at this level provides clear improvements to individual privacy, as trajectory data is no longer directly linked to an individual. However, with advanced methods, an individual's likely trajectory data can still be reconstructed.
Recent research has shown that user trajectories can be recovered with 91% accuracy from aggregated location data that was collected from mobile applications [34] . This research shows how data that was previously considered privacy preserving will continue to be proved otherwise as more advanced statistical techniques are developed.
However, it's also worth noting that re-identifying an individual's trajectory from this aggregated data is complex and now takes an additional step: an attacker first needs to reconstruct trajectory data for individual users. Then, after reconstructing trajectories, an attacker can match location points to a user record. The difficulty of this process likely scales with the number of users represented in each neighborhood, and the reconstructed trajectories are only probabilistic. They lack the certainty of knowing one user's point is followed by the next. These probabilistic trajectories can still provide useful information to aid predatory marketers and skip-tracing firms, and for that reason they present risk to the people who may be pursued. 
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Coarsened Aggregated Location Data
Level of Aggregation
This case of aggregate data is similar to the previous in that it does not represent individual user trajectories. Location points generated by a user are linked to a census block group for the user, instead of a unique user ID. The location points are also aggregated to a similar level of neighborhood or census block instead of specifying longitude and latitude, making this data lower resolution than the previous case. (See Table 4 ). This data again represents the distribution and movements of people over space and time but obscures the precise locations that were visited.
Market utility
Retailers can still use data at this level of spatial resolution to inform decisions for where to open new outlets. They can observe the areas where people congregate at different parts of the day and how far those locations are from people's home areas in order to predict the success of potential store locations. Businesses can also continue to use this aggregated location data to identify audiences, although their estimates will be less granular. For example, sporting goods retailers might observe the areas from which people tend to travel to camp grounds and other outdoor activity locations, and focus marketing efforts to those areas. Marketing firms might observe the areas from which people travel to specific types of large events, like music festivals, in order to target marketing campaigns for similar events in the future.
Public Utility
Coarsely aggregated location data can be used to supplement census data and provide population density data to countries where conducting an accurate census is not feasible [21] .
Census data is an important tool for government agencies. For example, in the United States, it is used for both governance and infrastructure. U.S. Census data is used to allocate the seats of the U.S. House of Representatives to the states based on their population, and it is used to inform decisions on where to build and maintain schools, hospitals, transportation infrastructure, and police and fire departments. However due to the cost and logistic complexity of conducting large surveys, the U.S. Census is only conducted every ten years, and can therefore only provide a snapshot of the population at a point in time. In other countries, census data is not collected at all. Recent studies demonstrate how location data collected by mobile phone network operators can provide cost-effective and accurate maps of population distributions over national scales and any time period [21] . This data can fill in the gaps between the infrequent collections of census data, and provide population estimates in countries where census data is not available.
Risk
Data aggregated at this level presents significantly less risk than the previous levels. Individuals are not directly linked to locations, and locations are recorded at a low spatial resolution.
However, individual trajectories can still be inferred from this data. The same researchers who reconstructed individual trajectories from aggregate location data generated by mobile applications did the same with aggregate location data provided by a wireless network operator [34] . The location data provided by the network operator was of low spatial resolution, and then aggregated to remove unique user IDs, making it match our case of aggregation level. The researchers reported a 73% accuracy rate for reconstructing individual trajectories from this data. These results are subject to the number of users generating a dataset and the shape of the data with respect to the spatial distributions of the users over time. These results are also subject to change as statistical methods advance in the future and more user data becomes available. This analysis is a reminder that even location datasets that were considered sufficiently anonymized or aggregated in the past can leak important privacy information.
Yet even if advanced methods are used to reconstruct user trajectories from these types of aggregate datasets, the level of risk associated with them is still lower. The reconstructed trajectories are only probabilistic and the points within them are of low spatial resolution. These inferred trajectories only represent the areas where a user probably was at different points in time. This data can still be abused and used to exploit vulnerable individuals, but with less precision than more granular datasets.
Discussion
Data detailing human mobility at scale has a wide array of uses and utility, but carries a significant personal risk.
Researchers who attempt to measure and describe this relationship between risk and utility often define both as quantitative attributes of data, rather than through the contextual impacts of its use. Quantitative measures of risk and utility do provide a useful compass and starting point: they can help researchers and policymakers understand how aggregation and anonymization strategies affect the value of location data as a traded commodity. However, when the real-world usage and risks of various data aggregation levels are considered, it becomes clear that risk and utility are closely coupled with the interests of who is using the data (e.g. public good vs private firms) and the people detailed in these datasets who are most at risk.
By examining example use-cases of location data by both private and public entities, some common patterns emerge.
Many private uses of high-resolution location data provide value through identifying information at some resolution about individuals. Even if the data describes indirect information about an individual, being able to link it to a particular advertising target or profile is crucial in current value models. For instance, knowing the behavioral profile of people that live in a certain neighborhood or census block group provides firms with a greater contextual understanding of individuals who live in those areas, not the areas themselves. In the cases of skip-tracing firms and individualized marketing, the identifiability of the data is it's selling point, and so the value of the products hinge on their resolution at the individual level. built through public-private partnerships that the federal government subsidizes heavily [62] . Bike sharing programs like New York's CitiBike or Boston's Bluebikes are often owned by the cities themselves as public infrastructure, but operated by a private firm that is required to share usage data with the city [63] . Ride-sharing companies like Uber and Lyft use public roadways to operate, and have recently faced legal pressure to enter into data sharing agreements with cities. Lyft, for example, was recently ordered to share data with the city of Seattle by way of its public records law, as the data was found to be of clear value to public interest [64] . Michael Ryan, a Seattle assistant city attorney, explained that Lyft is "a business that is conducted solely on the city streets and the taxpayers pay for the streets" [65] . These examples demonstrate a precedent for private firms that use public infrastructure to share the data that is collected via that infrastructure. Yet in all these examples, a transaction between public infrastructure and public data collected by private firms is clear.
The "infrastructure" used by LBS companies is far more muddled than in these cases. LBS companies operate by providing convenient ways for firms to access a user's location from their smartphone, but do not utilize GPS services or telecom services directly like telecom companies. They also do not facilitate urban movement directly, like in the case of bike sharing or ride sharing firms. Even so, the data is still generated by the public, and like the example of the Seattle case against Lyft, there is a strong case to be made that aggregated LBS data is in the public interest. Without a clear transaction of public infrastructure, can private firms be compelled to share data collected about the public?
If this data is to be shared, then deciding how it is shared is also important. Ride sharing services often share data in the form of aggregated trips between census tracts. This is similar to our second aggregation case, where user trajectories are coarsened to the level of census statistical areas. However, the risk profile of ridesharing data is very different than location service data because it is less ubiquitous. First, only individuals that use or can afford ridesharing services are represented in ridesharing data. Second, only fragments of individual mobility patterns are represented in data from ridesharing services. This is in contrast to the more pervasive data collected by LBS firms, whose resulting datasets are more complete, and can include a user's location before, during and after a ride. Still, like ridesharing services, aggregation is the clearest way forward for LBS firms to share data with the public given the current data market. These considerations only begin to address the imbalance in the current public and private markets for location data. They do not address the significant risk involved in the current unregulated data market, where individual trajectories are sold and purchased with little oversight.
How to manage this risk, let alone open the value of LBS data to the public remain open questions. Until these questions are answered, an imbalance between individual risk and the private and public utility presented by LBS data will persist.
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